Typical Staff Size
A compact team of operators, maintenance technicians, lab staff, electricians, supervisors, engineers, safety leads, and administrative personnel supports daily operations.
Training and demo landing page
A fictional municipal utility environment for practicing incident management, OT security monitoring, and coordinated emergency response in critical infrastructure.
SD-WTP represents a small city wastewater treatment plant responsible for protecting public health, reducing environmental impact, and keeping local water infrastructure reliable.
A compact team of operators, maintenance technicians, lab staff, electricians, supervisors, engineers, safety leads, and administrative personnel supports daily operations.
The plant collects and treats wastewater, manages biosolids, monitors discharge quality, and maintains critical equipment that communities rarely see but always depend on.
Industrial control systems, plant historians, workstations, remote access, business email, and collaboration tools all shape the cyber-physical risk picture.
This exercise is based on sludge dewatering, a normal wastewater process that reduces the water content of sludge before hauling, disposal, or beneficial reuse. The process depends on predictable flow, polymer dosing, torque, speed, and equipment health.
A centrifuge is central to the scenario. It spins sludge at high speed so heavier solids separate from liquid. If speed, feed rate, vibration, or control logic are manipulated, the effect can move quickly from process instability to equipment damage, safety concerns, and operational disruption.
Sludge enters the dewatering area from upstream treatment processes.
Polymer is added to help solids bind together and separate more efficiently.
High-speed rotation separates cake solids from centrate liquid.
Operators monitor quality, equipment state, alarms, and downstream impacts.
The training concept is inspired by the Stuxnet attack, where malicious code targeted industrial control logic and manipulated centrifuge behavior while masking abnormal activity. This exercise adapts that lesson to a fictional wastewater environment: process changes may look like mechanical trouble at first, but the root cause could involve removable media, phishing, credential theft, or OT network compromise.
By 2026, SD-WTP has deployed passive OT sensors from Clarion OT. The sensors observe traffic without controlling the process, helping teams detect unusual communications, asset behavior, protocol activity, and possible indicators of compromise.
Clarion OT sensors passively monitor industrial network traffic. They can help inventory OT assets, baseline normal behavior, highlight new or unexpected communications, detect suspicious protocol usage, and provide evidence for incident responders without sending control commands to plant equipment.
Level 2.5 gives visibility close to SCADA and control communications. Level 3.5 gives visibility into the OT DMZ, where remote access, file movement, patch staging, and cross-boundary services often become important during an investigation.
SD-WTP has a young Emergency Response Group with early processes already in place. During an incident, they use an ICS-inspired structure to coordinate leadership, operations, planning, logistics, finance, safety, and public information.
Each scenario gives participants a different entry path into the same operational problem: how to identify, coordinate, and respond when cyber activity threatens wastewater operations.
A removable USB device is introduced, similar in spirit to the Stuxnet pathway. Participants investigate whether the event is isolated, whether OT assets show abnormal behavior, and how the centrifuge process is affected.
A staff member opens an HR gift award attachment. The exercise follows the shift from business email compromise to ransomware response, unified command, service continuity, and OT impact assessment.
A phishing attack harvests OT credentials tied to Clarion OT access. Participants trace the credential misuse, review passive monitoring clues, and respond when centrifuge behavior starts to resemble the Stuxnet-inspired process manipulation.
Use these links during facilitation, participant briefings, and unified command discussion.
Interactive process view for the fictional SD-WTP centrifuge and dewatering scenario.
https://iotpivot.com/demo/wtp/Reference demo for understanding how centrifuge manipulation inspired this exercise.
https://iotpivot.com/demo/stuxnet/Conference space SD-WTP uses for unified command meetings during an incident response.
https://iotpivot.com/demo/msteams/Credential-harvesting scenario that can lead into OT investigation and centrifuge impact.
https://iotpivot.com/demo/phishing1/This training platform is for incident management in critical infrastructure and OT environments. It is designed for safe discussion, tabletop-style learning, and demo-based exploration of how organizations coordinate during cyber-physical incidents.